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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE WAS DENIED HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY BY 
HAVING A PREJUDICED JUROR AND THE CRONIC RULE 
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The Cronic rule and not the Strickland rule should be applied in this case as prejudice 
can be presumed. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (\9%4)Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Once a juror has unequivocally stated that he or 
she cannot weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice then actual prejudice is 
presumed, and that juror cannot serve as a member of the jury without violating a 
defendant's constitutional rights. A potential juror who clearly expresses both strong 
biases and uncertainty about his or her ability to be fair and impartial must be excused for 
cause. State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 630-31 (Utah 1977). The right to trial by an 
impartial jury is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, and therefore it is essential that a defendant be tried by a juror that can 
weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, 
art. I § 12. "The right to a fair and impartial jury is a constitutional cornerstone of our 
criminal justice system." State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ^  7, 190 P.3d 1259. 
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1. As Juror Blackhurst unequivocally declared that she could not weigh the 
evidence fairly and without prejudice, the defendant is entitled to the 
presumption that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to remove 
the juror. 
To qualify as a juror, a person must be able to enter upon that service with an open 
mind, free from bias and prejudice. "In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the 
criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, "indifferent" jurors. The failure to 
accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due 
process." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) see also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 
(1948). 
In the context of jury selection, by showing that a prospective juror was not 
impartial a defendant is entitled to the presumption that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
failure to remove the juror. State v. King, 2008 UT 54 118, 190 P.3d 1283 (King 
IV)(citing Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001)). Although the 
State argues that the record is insufficient to show that Blackhurst was actually biased, it 
is difficult to conceive of how else a juror can notify a court that they are not impartial if 
stating "no" to the question, "can you weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice," is 
not sufficient to be proof of actual bias. There is simply no basis to reject Juror 
Blackhurst's declaration of her lack of impartiality as anything other than sincere, true, 
and correct. Prejudice is therefore presumed under Cronic and the defendant's 
conviction should be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial with an impartial 
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jury. 
2. Trial counsel failed to actively participate in jury selection on behalf of his 
client. 
When selecting the jury members in the above case, trial counsel focused his inquiry 
primarily on the inconvenience to his neighbors and friends among the prospective jury 
members rather than in choosing a fair and impartial jury for his client. For example, 
trial counsel requested that Bruce Hall be removed for cause because it would be difficult 
for him to plan a family funeral and not because he believed Mr. Hall would be 
prejudiced against the defendant. 
MR. HARMON: I think we ought to take him off (inaudible) be fair to him. 
I'd ask that we take Bruce Hall off, too.... 
THE COURT: He said he was--
MR.ELDRIDGE: Yeah. Is h i s -
THE COURT: Julie. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: The live across from Derek. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. ELDREDGE: Okay. I know. (Inaudible). She accidentally took - she got 
her medications mixed up. She accidentally took some medication that was pretty 
probably impairing to her. She went to work, and at work they could tell that she 
was not in good shape, so they told her to go home. So she drove home and when 
she got home she crashed into his car. So she came in (inaudible) charge that the 
hospital was DUI for allowing her to drive home in that condition. It was a 
stretch. So that's - 1 think that's (inaudible) 
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MR. HARMON: Yeah, all right. Well, there just is - - he's got his hands full 
now because Julie's ex-husband was - - he killed himself a couple of weeks ago, 
and that was at the same time that they were having the funeral for her mom, and 
then this aunt passed away. They've been down giving her daily care and had her 
move into the home. Poor Bruce, he's just got his hands full. 
THE COURT: Then we have this Kirk Olsen who said he was a victim of 
assault and thought it would impact his ability to be fair. Mr. Evans, I -
Mr. ELDRIDGE: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You're challenging him for cause, Mr. Harmon? 
MR. HARMON: Yeah. I think we should. 
THE COURT: That's the only ones I had. 
Although the State argues that defense counsel plainly participated in the proceedings 
when he successfully moved to strike juror Carter (Hall), the record demonstrates that 
trial counsel was concerned primarily with the inconvenience to Mr. Hall and not 
concerned with choosing a fair and impartial jury for his client. App. Br. at 28, R 116: 
28. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO 
INVESTIGATE JUROR BLACKHURST'S NEGATIVE REPLY TO 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SHE COULD WEIGH THE 
EVIDENCE FAIRLY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND THE 
COURT'S FAILURE TO DO SO IS ANALYZED UNDER AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION STANDARD 
The law on voir dire of jury panels "is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
D o ~ ~ * Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court, and its rulings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
demonstrated abuse of discretion." Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 
P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988).. The abuse of 
discretion standard requires a Court to find error "only when the record clearly indicates 
that the decision [regarding the scope of questioning] was unreasonable." State v. 
Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1995). 
The Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require a trial court to probe 
bias on its own initiative when a prospective juror's voir dire statement facially raises a 
question of partiality or prejudice. Although the State argues that it is inappropriate for a 
trial court to interfere with counsel's conscious choices in the jury selection process 
notwithstanding the existence of a reasonable basis for objecting to a juror, if probing 
reveals potential bias, a trial judge must conduct rehabilitative inquiry until the inference 
of bias is rebutted. App. Br. At 47 quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 32, 12 P.3d 
92. Utah Code §78B-1-105(3) requires a trial court, on its own initiative or when 
requested by a prospective juror, to determine whether the prospective juror is 
disqualified from jury service. The Code requires the court to base its decision in part on 
information provided on the juror qualification form; an interview with the prospective 
juror; or other competent evidence. Id. The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure also place 
a responsibility upon the trial judge to investigate a prospective juror's voir dire 
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statement that facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice and "an abuse of 
discretion by the trial judge occurs unless the challenged juror is removed for cause or 
unless the judge or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted." Utah 
Rules Crim. Proc, Rule 18(e)(14).Once statements are made during voir dire that 
"facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless 
the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court or counsel investigates 
farther and finds the inference rebutted." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,127, 24 P.3d 948 
quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). Rebuttal can be accomplished by 
showing that a juror's statement was merely the product of a 'light impression' and not 
one that would 'close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition.5 " 
Id. (quoting State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980)). 
The record in this case clearly demonstrates that the trial court did not ask Juror 
Blackhurst any questions to determine if she was disqualified from jury service once she 
had admitted on her jury questionnaire that she could not weigh the evidence fairly and 
without prejudice. Although the State did question Juror Blackhurst in chambers, his 
question only concerned whether or not she would be uncomfortable in her service at the 
jail should she find the defendant guilty. R 116; 33-34. This question and Juror 
Blackhurst's reply that she did not think so was not sufficient to rebut the question of 
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partiality and prejudice raised by Juror Blackhurst in her questionnaire and the trial court 
abused its discretion by failing to question Juror Blackhurst or remove her from the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court find 
that the defendant was denied his right to a fair trial and reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
DATED S3*& April, 2012. 
A 9 r_ 
.JEM ^ A~^ P- P ^ 
ANN P. BOYLE *" 
Attorney for Appellant 
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